
From One Project to Another: Unintended Consequences and People's Expectations of Climate Mitigation Project in Central Kalimantan

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the dynamics of environmental interventions supported by aid projects and community responses as the subject of intervention. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork, I looked into how connections between local and global entities occurred, between the local villagers in Central Kalimantan and the climate mitigation project of REDD+. Both of these entities met when the global discourse on climate change started to gain ground. This paper discusses how environmental interventions lead to different expectations and unintended consequences. I see community responses as choices and decisions which were historically constructed. These choices, expectations, and decisions are related to people's experience with previous intervention agents and local livelihood dynamics. This local-global interaction has yielded unintended outcomes and led to different expectations for a REDD+'s demonstration activities project. When these two entities - local people and KFCP (Kalimantan Forest Climate Partnership) - meet in the global agenda to mitigate climate change, friction emerges due to a variety of interests in the village. My findings demonstrate how a reforestation program could lead to a socio-economic inequality. Land conflicts are likely to occur because of alternative livelihood programs which introduced rubber seeds.

Keywords: *Central Kalimantan; climate; environmental intervention; expectation; unintended consequences*

INTRODUCTION

Under the global discourse on climate change, Indonesia as a Global South country has become a target subject of a mitigation scheme project called REDD+ (*Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation*). Environment governmentality to protect tropical forests is considered as a plausible scheme to solve global emission problems. This scheme was born when countries joining *Conference of the Parties* (COP) proposed the solution to climate change problems: to protect tropical forests. Afterward, at the 13th COP meeting in Bali in 2007, those countries negotiated to formulate the best solution which produced an idea to make an emission reduction project

called REDD+ (Kompas 20/05/11). The international scheme is one of the big schemes that was expected to be adequate to eliminate carbon emissions on earth.

In this mechanism, those expected to reduce forest destruction are developing countries with support from industrial countries. The developed countries will then give some incentives to the developing countries when the latter successfully reduce carbon emissions. For example, Indonesia has been promised to receive a USD 1 billion grant from Norway if it can protect its tropical forests from destruction (Kompas 20/05/11). Furthermore, some international institutions have engaged, and several

bilateral agreements have been made for pilot projects commonly known as REDD+'s demonstration activity. Indonesia also has served as a host for this demonstration activity.

The Demonstration Activity (DA) REDD+ project was conducted to test the carbon trading mechanism in 2010 in Central Kalimantan. The DA REDD+ project called KFCP (Kalimantan Forest Climate Partnership) was carried out in the ex-MRP (Mega Rice Project) area which has been endorsed by President Soeharto in 1995 and failed. The DA REDD+ project involving locals in seven villages in Kuala Kapuas Regency was implemented to preserve the ecosystem of the ex-Mega Rice Project area. Tanah Air¹⁾ Village was among the villages included in the project area. In this village, various KFCP programs have been run to see how the REDD+ mechanism can be applied and later multiplied in other areas. The project was mainly aimed at introducing a good governance principal through the institution development of a DA REDD+, to conduct reforestation and develop an alternative livelihood program. The intervention program including technical intervention was expected to fix the condition of destroyed peatland, as well as to give incentives to the people participating in the program.

Several scholars have pointed out how the REDD+ project managed to bring socio-economic impacts, such as small scale and rural livelihood (Harrison, 2015; Harvey et al., 2018; Poudel et al., 2015; Pouliot et al., 2012; Than et al., 2016). On the other hand, it also proved that this mechanism came with risk, inequity, and disappointment. The experience learned from Noel Kempff's area in 1997 showed that the large part of profit distribution or the benefit from the program was grabbed by state agents, the local government, as well as international environmental NGOs (Schroeder, 2010). Benefits received from environmental projects such as REDD+ are monopolized by established elite structures such as land owners (Chomba et al., 2016). The project also creates a frame depicting benefits to society which in practice creates disappointment (Massarella et al., 2018).

Several studies have been conducted in the context of REDD+'s Demonstration Activities in Central Kalimantan. Olbrei and Howes (2012) showed the aim and "promise" displacement stated by KFCP related to land width reduction which will be rehabilitated due to financial constraints. Aside from that, program delays as well as unsynchronized practices in the field different from the planned document are found in this study. In the Ex- Peat Land Management area, some ethnographic studies have been done related to the establishment of REDD+'s sequential project which strongly emphasize

people's participation (Vanga, 2013), women's role (Herminasari, 2013), and the strengthening of the local elites (Utama, 2013). Other examined disputes and conflicting values between the project and the local people (Lounela, 2015, 2020).

Looking at the relationship between the community and the intervention program, the historical approach is a very important entry point. Several studies have begun to pay attention to how community responses are formed based on past experiences regarding relations with outsiders and the image of progress (West, 2006), and the historical relationship of inequality in access to resources (Chomba et al., 2016). To explore further the study that focuses on the historical study above, I would like to convey a historical narrative taken from similar programs that have repeatedly appeared in the community. The pile of problems and experiences from the existing programs have overshadowed the current program, and possibly other programs in the future.

In this paper, I argue that people create expectations and valuations based on their interests, and respond to and utilize intervention programs based on their experiences in dealing with similar projects in the past. Unintended consequences exist because the community views intervention programs as a door to accessing resources. By examining these dynamics, I avoided the dichotomy between developers and the subject of intervention (De-Sardan, 2005) and focused on the interface between the actors involved, as offered by Crewe and Harrison (1998). Therefore, the main objective of this paper is to see how the historical experience of local communities influences their expectations of the program, which could produce unintended consequences.

Several anthropological studies on development interventions from both the state and the Aid-Project try to deconstruct how development interventions build legitimacy for program implementation. Some discuss the issue of underdevelopment narrative construction and unexpected consequences due to the inability to see the complexities of society (Ferguson, 1990; Li, 2007). Other scholars discuss the power relations between the developer and the subject community (Escobar, 2011), the construction of solutions from experts using modern knowledge (Mosse, 2005) by putting aside local knowledge (Hobart, 2002), as well as efforts to integrate local perspectives in intervention (O'Malley, 1996). These studies emphasize discourse narratives through the perspective of governmentality as a main focus to see the power running between developers and the community.

Environmental issues are also an entry point for intervention agents to offer solutions through

their programs, such as sustainable development, biodiversity and forest conservation, as well as climate change mitigation through carbon emission reduction. West (2006) saw that the society was longing for some improvements in life quality that can be achieved through “development”. The picture of better life for the people is the concept that has been brought in by some external agents, such as conservation, who established interaction and reciprocity with the local people. Agrawal (2002) discussed forest management in India and focused his study on the ‘governmentalization of environment’. He proposed the ‘Environmentality’ concept by referring to the relation between power/knowledge, forest governmentality institution (the state), and the governmentality subject.

To get a clearer understanding on how intervention agents operate, the study of James Ferguson (1990) can be referred to as an interesting case. Ferguson conducted a study on one of many intervention programs in Lesotho after its independence. Ferguson studied an intervention program called Tsaba-Seka Project (World Bank) which focuses on the agricultural and veterinary improvements, but less sensitive to the social-cultural problems and political issues in the Lesotho society. To comprehend the working process of “the machine” which ends in the state’s control strengthening local society, he tries to break down the discourse and the apparatus which produce a narration to do development intervention.

The narrative was formed as the basis to justify the society’s livelihood improvements. Lesotho was labelled as an underdeveloped country and perceived as closed characteristic poor society with a subsistence livelihood system. This ‘backwardness’ was related to the state’s absence in that region. To improve the people’s living standard, some programs were run and resulted in unintended outcomes. Started from the main program to increase cow productivity by holding a routine auction market and constructing roads, the project failed to understand that cows are people’s property which is closely related to social relation and prestige for the owners. Due to the cultural bond between cows and their owners, the people were reluctant to sell their cattle. Afterward, with the narration of the state’s absence which resulted in an undeveloped Lesotho, this project constructed streets and administration offices in the sub-district center, which was finally controlled by state bureaucracy and paramilitary force. Consequently, the government’s ruling party could potentially conquer and dominate their opposition: Lesotho’s people who live in the highland (Ibid).

Intervention agents are what Ferguson (1990)

called an anti-politics machine, where the intervention agent has put aside the social-political problems in the society, which as a result produces unintended outcomes. According to Ferguson, the intervention project is an arena where the plan sometimes results in something that is never imagined before. Furthermore, it has been explained that the intervention came in the complex context of reality. Ferguson said, “Intentional plans interacted with unacknowledged structures and change events to produce unintended outcomes which turn out to be intelligible not only as the unforeseen effects of intended intervention but also as the unlikely instruments of an unplotted strategy” (ibid).

Faced with development interventions, society is overshadowed by various expectations and hopes. In sociological studies, expectations are more focused on changes that occur due to new technology. Expectations are assumed to come from the image and promises that are embodied in new technology (Van Lente, 2012) which can affect the collective and innovation of a project (Konrad, 2006). I use these expectations to see what Massarela et.al (2018) saw about expectations in environmental interventions.

As in West’s (2006) study, the presence of conservation organizations attached to a new form of governance is expected to bring progress in society. Expectations that arise are the pictures of the development such as airport construction, education facilities improvements, and health care service development. These promises for development created significant expectations in society for their life quality improvements so that they were willing to interact and received the intervention programs. This expectation of DA REDD+ arises not from the promise of the program bearer, but comes from various historical relations between the community and external agencies.

My findings are drawn from 6 months of ethnographic research in Central Kalimantan, between February and July 2012 in the REDD’s Demonstration Activity area called Kalimantan Forest Climate Partnership (KFCP). To obtain initial information on the development of REDD+ project, I visited three NGOs that focus on the environment and local people issues such as WALHI (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup/the Indonesian Forum for the Environment), AMAN (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara/the Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago), and YPD (Yayasan Petak Danum). I, then, decided to conduct research in Tanah Air Village, which is included in the KFCP working area. Interviews were conducted with head of village, district leader, customary leader, head of RT (neighborhood unit),

members of AMT (Activity Management Team) and MT (Monitoring Team) of KFCP, the elders, and local people including rubber farmer, fisherman, and gold miner. In addition, I conducted interviews with KFCP staff, such as the Community Engagement Team, the Reforestation Team, and also the Livelihood Team.

Therefore, based on the description in the background, this paper attempts to trace how the climate change intervention program produces unintended consequences and expectations of local people. To explain this phenomenon, I divide this paper into three main parts: (1) how historically the forestry intervention landscape is being formed in Tanah Air; (2) dynamics that emerged in the community regarding intervention programs that could result in an unintended consequence; (3) expectations and valuation arise from local people when facing forestry programs from REDD+ demonstration activity.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Intervention Landscape in Tanah Air

State Forest Project

Historically, the people of Tanah Air have been involved in several forestry programs carried out by the state in 2000-2009. Relationships with these projects repeatedly occur, making the area a development frontier. A government (Department of Forestry) program called DAK-DR (Special Allocation Funds for Reforestation) ran from 2003 to 2007. The Department of Forestry funded this program to conduct reforestation. The project that was accommodated with an agreement between a private company (people called it CV) with farmer groups requires a proposal with the group's name, group members' name, and width of the area proposed. The benefit from this activity was quite attractive for villagers. The available fund was quite fantastic, reaching a billion rupiah for one sub-district area. A big incentive was given in every activity, such as land cleansing, planting, and maintenance. For example, a farmer group can get around IDR 10,000,000/hectare for land cleansing. Nevertheless, this program gave benefit only to some people with good relation to forest agency. In the informal interview with one officer of CV for the DAK DR program, he mentioned that KPK (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi* or the Commission for Corruption Eradication) has checked on him related to project management. KPK had smelled corruption and budget markup. However, in the field assessment, KPK could not prove that the suspected corruption had occurred. The program was then considered a success, leading to an appreciation from

the Department of Forestry to the CV manager. He had the opportunity to join a seminar on seeding in Bogor as one of the rewards.

In 2009, the Department of Forestry implemented the IUPHKK-HTR program (*Izin Usaha Pemanfaatan Hasil Hutan Kayu pada Hutan Tanaman Rakyat* or License to Utilize Forest Product in Smallholder Plantation). The program, which aims to restore and preserve forest, received public support. In regard to the existing rules, HTR is a plantation forest inside a production forest developed by individuals or through a cooperation to increase the potential and quality of the production forest by applying the silviculture to preserve the forest's natural resources. The definition refers to the Regulation of the Ministry of Forestry of the Republic of Indonesia No: P. 3/Menhut-Ii/2012 on Work Plan for Timber Utilization Business in Smallholder Plantation. In other words, the society is expected to benefit from the forest resources they maintain.

Tanah Air village was introduced with the HTR program, which promises profits to the forest community groups. In the socialization, a forestry instructor told every farmer group that they would receive an incentive of IDR 125,000,000 as capital to plant wood. The groups will then be allowed to cooperate with a licensed timber company to harvest the timber. "We will sell the timber. Our job is to plant," said a villager. Aside from incentives, the HTR program also offers 15 hectares of forest area management for one forest farmer group. The lure of profits and access to land becomes a pull factor for the people to join these forestry projects. With the help of the forestry instructor, the villagers joining this program will develop a proposal to obtain an HTR license.

In the proposal, the group is required to provide the organizational structure and map out the proposed HTR area. Previously, the HTR farmer groups must map out 15 hectares of land in the forest area. The mapping can be observed physically from some of the signboards of farmer groups with the land width that I found in some spots inside the peat forest. In the proposal developing process, the villagers were asked to deposit some amount of money to the related party. To smoothen the process of proposal endorsement, the HTR groups had to deposit IDR 250,000. However, after the proposal and the money had been delivered to the instructor along with endorsement from the head of village and from the sub-district office, there was no follow-up to the HTR project.

Even though the program did not run as promised, the farmer groups' documents have been legalized by the related parties. Head of the village, the Department of Forestry in Kuala Kapuas District, as well as the sub-

district office have given their recommendation and have signed the proposal. From the villagers' perspective, these documents can serve as a guide to claim the land. Some villagers said that according to their document HTR's land becomes the land of those who join the farmer group and can be utilized anytime.

How people negotiate and interact with external parties relates to accessing natural resources. In forestry programs accommodated by the Department of Forestry (DAK DR and HTR), villagers comprehend the access to forest resources, and the land is very profitable. According to the relationship between local people and intervention projects, it can be said that "...people facing chronic insecurity prioritize the maintenance of relationships with people (patrons or projects) having better access to resources and offering social protection in the short term, even though this limits their capacity for longer-term economic mobility" (Wood 2003 via Moose 2005). On the contrary, the local people in Tanah Air tend to create a chance to gain an opportunity to claim the land for expanding their rubber garden or other cash crops that will bring benefits in the future.

KFCP Project in Tanah Air

In 2005, the RED (Reduction of Emission from Deforestation) mechanism emerged, which then changed into REDD (plus Forest Degradation) in the 13th COP 2007 in Bali. Afterward, the 14th COP in 2008 at Poznan, REDD(+) appeared. The (+) here was an addition which refers to a consideration of the conservation roles, sustainable forest management and the improvement of carbon storage development in the forests of developing countries. Reforestation and afforestation were also parts of the mechanism (Cerbu et al., 2011; Wertz-Kanounnikoff & Angelsen, 2009)

Indonesia becomes a desirable area for the REDD+ project as this country has pleaded to reduce its carbon emission level in an international meeting. In the G-20 and COP 15 Conference in 2009, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono said that Indonesia is committed to reducing carbon emissions by 26% internally and will increase the carbon emission reduction to 41% with the help of developed countries. Aside from that, he also mentioned that the 9.5-13 % of emission reduction would be coming from peatland areas (Mulyani & Jepson, 2013; Noor & Sabiham, 2010). Moreover, as Indonesia is the third-largest country with tropical forests, it is considered to support the world's carbon stock (Mulyani & Jepson, 2013).

Departing from the agreement at the global level on REDD+, various institutions started to

initiate demonstration activity of REDD+ in 2007. Demonstration activity is implemented in a sub-national location or a particular unit to reduce deforestation and forest degradation in the location (Cerbu et al., 2011). Various demonstration activities were carried out to prepare for the REDD+ mechanism, the plan of which was to be discussed in the global meeting to mitigate climate change in the future. Thus, flexibility becomes one consideration in implementing REDD+. According to Angelsen (2008), this mechanism is "a large-scale experiment, and we need to leave room for midcourse corrections as we learn what works and what does not."

Australia tends to support mechanisms to combat climate change, including through REDD+. Australia also encourages the "market-based" approach for REDD+ and suggests a forest carbon market mechanism in the future. To support this, Australia gives AUD 200 million through IFCI (International Forest Carbon Initiative), which is managed by the Australian government and is represented by DCC (*Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency*) and AusAID institution (*Australian Agency for International Development*) (HuMa 2010). IFCI, established in 2007, is Australia's contribution as a global effort for REDD and aims to demonstrate REDD+ to be a part of a tremendous global climate change negotiation result in 2012. IFCI funds the activity with the grant from IAFCP (*Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership*) (KFCP 2009).

Although REDD+ scheme is considered as the scheme for global interest, it is undeniable that Australia's domestic interest in the climate change issue is very significant. Australia will encounter some direct impacts if climate change causes disasters such as the rise of world's sea level. Places whose population is concentrated in coastal lowlands face the big risk of seawater flooding. Aside from that, large semiarid areas can be easily affected and become deserts due to global warming. In addition to internal factors, Australia also tries to overcome refugees from Pacific Islands if there is sea level rise (Porter & Brown 1991: 45). These factors influence Australia's support for the agreements related to climate change issues under international negotiations, and also for the REDD+ scheme.

The DA REDD+ project attempts to revitalize or rehabilitate peatland in former peatland development areas (PLG). Based on the Minister of Forestry Decree No.68/Menhut-II/2008 on REDD demonstration activities pertaining to deforestation and forest degradation, the KFCP project was implemented. The main aim of the KFCP demonstration project is "to demonstrate the convincing, fair, and effective means to reduce

greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, including from peatland destruction, which can be used in the global agreement on climate change post-2012 and makes Indonesia's participation possible for the international carbon market in the future" (KFCP 2009)

This KFCP project takes place in Ex-MRP in Central Kalimantan. The demonstration activity will be implemented in the 120,000 ha area, in the northern part of the Ex-MRP area, part of Mentangai and Timpah Sub-district, Kuala Kapuas Regency. Block A and Block E, two areas with different characteristics, become the focus of this implementation project. In Block A, the area has been degraded as its forest hydrology system was destroyed due to Ex-MRP canal development. Meanwhile, the peat forest in the Block E area is still relatively good. This project will involve 14 villages and hamlets in the KFCP working area, including Tanah Air Village, located in the northeast area of Block E (KFCP 2009).

In this REDD's demonstration activity, KFCP has implemented some programs related to forest and peatland management. Technical intervention is among main KFCP activities at the village level. The programs include organizing canal closing to rehabilitate peatland hydrology, reforestation with local species plantation, fire prevention and control, monitoring vegetation and hydrology, and developing low carbon alternative livelihood. Moreover, KFCP will increase village institutions' capacity to implement and manage the REDD+ activity.

Who Benefited Most from the Reforestation Program?

One of the KFCP programs was the reforestation of degraded peatland in Block A of the former Mega Rice Project. According to Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership (IAFCP), this project aimed at restoring tree covering in damaged areas by encouraging natural regeneration and re-planting. This project involved local people in preparing the seeds as well as re-planting the peatland. Villages near peatlands received planting and seeds-preparation programs, while villages located further away from Block A, such as Tanah Air, got involved differently in which their people were involved in preparing nursery seeds starting from searching and upkeep until the seeds were ready to be planted. Through this activity, people from Tanah Air were given a chance to get incentives from the seeds they nursed since March 2011. The village itself was allocated with 144,000 seeds distributed to households. With a total of 373 households,

each household received 386 seeds. With a price of IDR 1,250 per seed, each household participating in this program could get around IDR 482,500. In the end, only 152 households joined this program and received a seed quota of around 897 seeds. The incentives that will be received by households participating in this program are approximate IDR. 1,121,250.00. This sum of money was paid in three terms: during seed searching, nurturing, and dispatch.

There was local dissatisfaction concerning the management of incentive procurement. The villagers criticized the multiple terms incentive payment because they perceived they received a minimum amount of money. "[We were] paid little by little. Once, [we were] paid IDR 300,000; and then IDR 50,000. Lastly, [we were paid] IDR 600,000 for dispatch costs. Nevertheless, that is not all," said one villager. Furthermore, people started to spread negative rumors related to this gradual incentive payment during the first term. This rumor focuses on project parties who want to take advantage of the incentives (West, 2006). One villager informed me that KFCP deliberately deposited the incentives for this project so that they could take the benefit from the interest.

"Initially, this seedbed project was to be over within three months, but apparently, it was extended. I knew what those people were trying to do. For example, if 200-million-rupiah funds were deposited for two to three months in the bank, they would profit from the interest. See, how much is the interest? They think we [the villagers] knew nothing about their 'game.'"

As villagers felt they were not given enough incentive, they demanded more seed allocation from KFCP. Those villages with no planting program would get the chance to get incentives directly from the nursery seed program. In comparison, in a planting program implemented in a village called *Hulu*, the household participant earned IDR 1,500,000 to plant seeds in a hectare of land in the ex-MRP area. With such incentive disparity, several people in Tanah Air felt they were being mistreated. In turn, this condition generated another discourse which stated that a village with no planting program would get a significant amount of seed allocation and eventually become the seedbed center. People were proposing a raise of 5000 seeds per household. Such propositions were discussed at the meeting with the representatives of KFCP (Community Engagement) in the village. However, during the second-term project's preparation and socialization, KFCP declined to accept

those propositions.

Nevertheless, by the end of the program, several people received more profit in the distribution process. During seed dispatch to the planting site located four hours away from their village, people tended to deposit their seeds to *klotok* owners. The villagers also still use some river transportation modes such as *jukung*, *ces* or *klotok*. *Klotok* is a large-engine and large capacity boat that was usually used in the past to transport illegal logging. According to my observation during fieldwork, *klotok* owners still did a small-scale timber trade. They worked to find timber around Tanah Air and then sold it around the Timpah District area or even farther around Kapuas Regency. This dispatch process was dominated by the owners of bigger capacity *klotok*, while those participating in the nursery seed program considered sending their seeds on their own would burden them with more operational costs, such as expenditure on diesel fuel. *Klotok* owners accumulated an even more immense amount of money than the participants, although they did not directly participate in the program. Raka, a participant of this program, argued that those *klotok* owners got the most significant profit during seed dispatch. To dispatch \pm 1000 seeds, they earned IDR 100,000. One *klotok* generally could carry more or less 10,000 seeds. Therefore, in one week during seed dispatch, they could amass approximately IDR 8,000,000. Reduced by operational costs such as spending on diesel fuel, they earned roughly IDR 5,000,000 in one week.

Expecting Access to Resources from Livelihood Program

The livelihood program was part of intervention activities at the village level regarding quality rubber seed distribution. In this program, the villagers would later receive 500 trees planted on their one-hectare land. This program's main goal was "to give incentive to the local people for adopting farming techniques, for doing other jobs without using fire in peatland, or for avoiding livelihood based on illegal logging in the woods" (IAFCP 2010).

People were interested in this program since they could use the incentive to take care of their rubber garden. To appeal to the villagers, KFCP focused on giving out money in this program. In opening a socialization event for the program, IDR 1.7 trillion budget was mentioned. According to villagers' calculation, if all 337 households in the village participated, each would get IDR 5,000,000 from this program. Villagers have their own expectation of how they use this incentive. "Even without livelihood [program], we would still plant rubber.

However, since it [livelihood program] gives money, we agree to participate," said one villager. They imagined using the incentive to pay the laborers they need for land clearing, and pay the cost of making a Certificate of Land Ownership (CLO). This condition shows that the people see the KFCP program as a means to obtaining more resources to develop their own rubber gardens.

However, what people imagined and planned using the allocated fund was in conflict with the KFCP plan and interests. Later on, KFCP made a surprising move by reporting the management of this fund. KFCP decided that half of the fund would be allocated to buy 260 rubber seeds of PB type from the private sector. "Why do you have to buy seeds from CV? We, local people, own many seeds in the plantation. Why benefits the CVs?" protested an *adat* leader. Despite the strong protest from the people, KFCP continued to buy seeds from CV. Furthermore, KFCP declined to make a Certificate of Land Ownership since they could not intervene in anything concerning land legalization, over which they had no control and authority.

Another issue rose when certain land was included as a part of technical intervention in the livelihood program. Villagers who owned the land would be registered by MT (Monitoring Team) representatives to be put in the database of rubber garden location maps. These land plots would be mapped out in detail on paper. A few days after the meeting, a man was sent as the village representative to map out the land plots of the rest of other villagers who participated in the program. The man who was also a member of MT saw the location plan of this high-quality rubber cultivation from each participant. He then drew a map. Upon finishing, he told me that several people actually admitted to preparing one hectare land for this KFCP program.

Such claims over land ownership occurred in several areas planned to be used as the location of livelihood programs. In those said locations, there were 42 heads of household who claimed over land which would be planted with rubber seeds. Anan who was a surveyor of this plantation location revealed to me, "Actually, not many of them own land, yet they said they did have." His concern about this whole claim over land ownership was apparent. He feared that this would only cause a new problem with regard to land management in Tanah Air. Land "claiming" might give rise to (new) conflict on land use in the village which had previously happened.

Land-related problems also usually stem from issues around land management. Tanah Air village also witnessed such a problem when a Smallholder Plantation

(HTR) was planned to be implemented there. The farmer community tried to gain access to a 15-hectare land offered by the HTR project. Considering the legal document was already on the hands of the heads of village and district, people thought the land was to be theirs. Anan who had experience with the HTR program admitted to having 15-hectare land under the name of a farmer community. Anan argued that even though the HTR failed to be implemented, those farmer communities who had submitted proposals would still get their land legalized – or basically, they would receive the promised land.

All the processes explained here show that the main goal of giving incentive through alternative livelihood programs apparently collided with the existing socio-economic structure in Tanah Air. The proposed profit was considered as an evident way of earning money as capital for their future rubber gardens. On the other hand, the presence of this program could possibly stir up conflict related to land management resulting from accumulated issues such as personal conflict and land claims made by other forestry programs.

CONCLUSION

People's responses to the emergence of interventions in their villages produced unintended outcomes that were not expected from the project. This problem can be seen from the dynamics that rise in the implementation of the reforestation program. For example, in the seedbed program, KFCP's initiative to give the incentive to the villagers turned out to be a capital accumulation for boat owners who played a key role in seed distribution. In other words, those who benefit the most from this program are not the residents who are directly involved in planting the seeds, but the *klotok* owners. Besides, program disparities in each village sparked "jealousy", as Tanah Air villagers want an equality of programs that can give similar or more profitable incentives to program participants.

Global governmentality, in this case it is REDD+'s demonstration activity, also raises villagers' expectations when it is implemented at the local level. The DA REDD+ project directly encountered the structure and context of local livelihood related to the community's hope of getting access to resources. This phenomenon can be seen from their historical experience when participating in government-run forestry programs in the past. Farmer groups formed to participate in the DAK-DR and HTR programs expect that the land they manage could be claimed and owned by them in the future.

The expectations of the community have also emerged regarding the livelihood program in KFCP. The people of Tanah Air considered joining the program to expand and develop their rubber gardens. Local people expected and imagined that the intervention program would give them access to claiming land.

By looking at the case study, one can see the program's unintended consequences and the community's expectations during the implementation of the REDD+ Activity Demonstration program in Central Kalimantan. As stated by Ferguson (1990), the intervention program will deal with the complexities of society related to historical journeys and political and economic structures. The program designer cannot read the unintended impact of the program because the focus is on technical problems (Li, 2007) to solve the climate problem. Then expectations arise because the community has had similar experiences with forestry programs, hoping for access to a resource, namely land. A critical reflection, in this case, is whether the community's expectations and experiences can become an integrated part of the intervention program. Efforts to integrate or listen to local aspirations can be a solution in intervention programs (O'Malley, 1998), although criticism of this amalgamation still appears.

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ENDNOTE

1) I used pseudonym for village and informants' name

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